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NOTES
TAX TITLES IN MONTANA
STATUS OF TAX DEED
The uncertain status of tax titles in Montana has led to a great deal
of litigation. The problem stems primarily from two sources: fiirst, tle
statutes are not clear on many points; and second, the rule of strict com-
pliance has been carried to such an extreme that deeds may be invalidated
for innocuous technicalities. County officers and private individuals seek-
ing such deeds commonly fail to follow the statutes closely enough, and
hence no title ever passes.
The Montana court has stated its position thus:
.. conduct of those vested with power to sell lands for delinquent
taxes must be closely scrutinized in order that there might be some
security for property rights. The officer who makes the sale sells
that which he does not own. The proceedings are to a large extent
ex parte, the owner is an unwilling party, is seldom if ever present
at the sale, is generally ignorant of it, and a tax almost always
bears a small proportion of the value of the property sold. Upon
these considerations it has generally been held proceedings on tax
sales should strictly comply with the statute....
... A tax deed must be contrued most strongly against him
who claims under it and, if one of two constructions will support
the claim of the citizen, the deed must be held invalid.!
Though this reference is to the duty imposed upon the county officer
conducting the proceeding, -the same rigid standards are imposed on the
one seeking the deed, whether he be a private party or the county in its
capacity as a purchaser. Instead of lending security to property titles this
doctrine of strict construction has accomplished the opposite, upsetting
long unquestioned titles for sheer technicalities.
This Note will examine the statutory steps in securing a tax deed and
the construction the court has given to these statutes, to illustrate wherein
the difficulties lie, and to determine the precise status of a tax deed in
Montana. This process will provide a warning and guide to county officers
conducting the proceeding and to those seeking the deed, and also present
a plea for reform."
'Rush v. Lewis and Clark County, 36 Mont. 566, 569, 93 Pac. 94, 944 (1908).
2The purpose of this note is not to cover the remedies for defective or doubtful tax
titles, but a brief indication of the available methods may serve as a point of refer-
ence. Revised Codes of Montana (hereinafter cited R.C.M.), 1947, § 84-4158 in-
corporates some special provisions relating to the ordinary proceeding to quiet title
when tax title is involved; R.C.M. 1947. § 84-4142 provides for quieting of title by
the county in the manner provided in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-6203 to -6211; R.C.M. 1947,
§§ 84-4144 to -4150 permits an action in district court to get a confirmation deed
and quiet title (either by the county or a private party) whenever the validity of
any deed issued before enactment (Feb. 15, 1945) of the provision (Laws of Mon-
tana, 1945, c. 43) appears doubtful; and R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4161 is a special short
method for quieting title discussed infra under the sub-title "Acquiring the Deed."
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THE TITLE AND INTEREST CONVEYED BY A TAX DEED
At the outset it should be understood what title the grantee of a tax
deed acquires. The matter is wholly statutory,. there being at least two
types of title that a state can confer.
"[T]he legislature has power to provide either that a tax sale
shall create a new title, cutting off all prior liens, encumbrances,
and interests, or to provide that the tax purchaser shall acquire
the interest only of the person in whose name the land was as-
sessed or of the real owner." (3 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., 2930,
§ 1492). By the enactment of § 2215, Revised Codes 1921 [now
§ 84-4161] providing that a tax deed conveys absolute title "free
from all encumbrances except a lien for taxes which may have
attached subsequent to the sale," our legislature adopted the first
course. The tax deed mentioned is not derivative but creates a
new title in the nature of an independent grant from the sover-
eign, extinguishing all former titles and liens not expressly ex-
empted from the operation.!
Thus any lien, interest, encumbrance, or title is extinguished by the
sales unless it can come within an express statutory exception.' Even tax
liens which attached prior to the sale are extinguished." Montana appar-
ently adheres to the doctrine that only separate interests in fee are separate-
ly taxable, lesser interests being included in a single assessment against the
owner of the freehold estate.! Thus a sale of a separately taxed life estate
does not affect the remainder interest. But any interest dependent upon
the fee is accepted subject to the above legal limitation. This includes
mortgages,' leases and royalty interests," and the right to exercise a possi-
bility of reverter.' An easement, however, is not an encumbrance but is
carved out of the estate and separately taxed. Therefore it is not extin-
guished by the sale of the servient estate ;o and other restrictive covenants,
though not creating easements, are held to survive.' The remedy for the
holder of such dischargeable interests lies in his right of redemption, for
it is not the sale that extinguishes the interest, but the final transfer of the
'State ex i-el. Great Palls v. Jeffries, 83 Mont. 111, 116, 270 Pac. 638, 640 (1928).
4Special and local improvement assessments [State ex rel. Great Falls v. Jeffries,
,3 Mont. 111, 270 Pac. 638 (1928)], as well as irrigation district bond liens [State
ex rel. Malott v. Board of County Commissioners, 89 Mont. 37, 296 Pac. 1 (1931)],
have been held not to be true taxes within the meaning of the statute and hence
have not been protected by the tax lien exception. As a result of these holdings
the legislature amended the statute in 1929 to include special local improvement
liens for assessments falling due after execution of the deed [Laws of Montana,
1929, c. 100, § 9; R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4170]. In 1937 the statute was amended again
to include irrigation district assessments payable after execution of the tax deed
[Laws of Montana, 1937, c. 63; R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4170] though the bonds were
issued prior thereto [Hartman v. Nimmack, 116 Mont. 392, 154 P.2d 279 (1944)].
5State ex rel. Great Falls v. Jeffries, 83 Mont. 111, 270 Pac. 638 (1928).
eSee Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945).
7Richardson v. Loyd, 90 Mont. 127, 300 Pac. 254 (1931).
'Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945).
'Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937).
cIbid.
"85 C.J.S. Taxation § 907 (1954). But see Tilden v. Chouteau County, 85 Mont. 898,
402, 279 Pac. 231, 232 (1929), wherein the court expresses "considerable doubt" as
to this, at least as to prior taxes.
[Vol. 20,
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title after the redemption period has expired. Thus if the owner or a re-
demptioner redeems, the property remains subject to all prior liens, etc."
JURISDICTION TO HOLD A TAX SALE
In order to vest the county treasurer with jurisdiction to sell land for
delinquent taxes, there must be (1) a valid assessment, (2) a valid levy, and
(3) nonpayment of the tax. Absence of any one of these elements will
render a tax sale absolutely void as a matter of due process, and property
interests are not affected thereby. However, "these jurisdictional require-
ments appearing, the requirement to sell is mandatory."'
TREASURER'S DELINQUENCY LIST AND NOTICE OF SALE"
The tax deed proceeding begins with a report, which the county treas-
urer must make twice a year to the county clerk, containing a complete list
of all delinquent taxes." Since at least 1927, cities and towns have not been
allowed to conduct sales to collect their own taxes and assessments but are
required to certify their delinquency list to the county treasurer who must
include it in the county delinquency list and notice of sale. Thereafter the
property is sold at one time at the county sale.'
Probably the most important thing in this list is an accurate descrip-
tion of the land upon which the tax is a lien.
In tax proceedings "the description must be certain of itself and
not such as to require evidence aliunde to render it certain....
Certainty in the description is required to apprise the owner that
his property is advertised for sale and to enable him to prevent
the sale by payment of the taxes thereon, and to impart informa-
tion to bidders of the actual extent and location of the premise to
be sold. All subsequent proceedings depend on this certainty. An
inaccurate or uncertain description defeats every step subsequent-
ly taken and as we have already seen, the uncertainty cannot be
cured by evidence aliunde."
After the June report has been made, the county treasurer must pub-
lish a notice of sale specifying therein: (1) that, at a given time and place
designated in the notice, all the property in the county upon which delin-
quent taxes are a lien will be sold at public auction unless before such sale
the taxes, together with all interest, penalties, and costs, are paid, and (2)
that there is on file in the treasurer's office, subject to public inspection,
a complete list of all persons and property in the county owing taxes, includ-
ing all city and town property as to which taxes or taxes and assessments
are delinquent."
285 C.J.S. Taxation 907 (1954).
"Martin v. Glacier County, 102 Mont. 213, 56 P.2d 742 (1936) ; State ezr re. Spokane
& Western Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 74 Mont. 346, 240 Pac. 837 (1925) ; 3 COOLEY,
TAXATION § 1393 (1924).
"This note refers to the 1947 Code except where reference to earlier laws is made
necessary. However, validity of a proceeding will undoubtdly be tested by the
statutes in force at the date of the sale in question. Accord, Fariss v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 31 F1 Supp. 571 (D. Mont. 1940).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 84-4111 to -4113.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4727.
"Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 407, 175 P.2d 182, 189 (1946).
"RLO.M. 1947, §§ 84-4117, -4119.
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The notice must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks
in such county newspaper as the board of county commissioners directs, and
if there is no newspaper published in the county then by posting a copy of
the list in three public places." Failure of the notice to comply strictly
with the requirements of the statute is fatal to the sale. Tjowever, the Mon-
tana statutes provide that the affidavit of proper publication which the
county treasurer is required to file with the county clerk is prima facie
evidence of all facts stated therein.w
Publication is the sole statutory method of notice. There is no require-
ment that personal notice of sale be given the delinquent taxpayer, as a tax
sale is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Consequently a published
notice with an accurate description of the property suffices to fulfill the
requirements of due process, and the fact that a person does not receive
actual notice of the sale is immaterial.' Every owner of Montana property
is held to know that it is taxed annually and if the tax is not paid his
property will be sold. Thus a non-resident must take measures to insure
that he will be represented when his property is called into requisition; if
he does not, and he fails to get the published notice, he must accept the con-
sequences. When property is sold as the property of a particular person
for taxes which have been correctly imposed upon the land, no misnomer of
the owner or supposed owner, or other mistake relating to the ownership
thereof will affect the sale or render it void or voidable, because the sale
is a proceeding in rem.' Thus if property is assessed in the name of X, or
X appears as the owner on the delinquency list, when in fact the true
owner is Y, the validity of the subsrquent tax and tax sale proceeding is not
affected thereby.'
If an assessment is valid in part and void in the balance, the owner of
the property may, prior to six days before the advertised sale date, deliver
to the county treasurer a written protest against such sale, signed by him-
self or his agent, specifying the portion of the tax he claims to be invalid
and the ground upon which the claim is based. Otherwise the validity
of the sale and subsequent proceeding may not be challenged on that
ground.' When such a protest is properly made the treasurer must by
statute either: (1) sell the property for the whole amount appearing upon
the duplicate assessment book, or (2) withdraw the property from the
sale and report the case to the board of county commissioners. The board
may either direct the foreclosure of the lien of such tax or direct the
treasurer to proceed with the sale.' This statute obviates any question
which might otherwise arise as to the validity of a sale where part of the
'
9R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4118.
*'L.C.M. 1947, § 84-4121; Towle v. St. Paul Permanent Loan Co., 84 Minn. 105, 86
N.W. 781 (1901) ; Genella v. Vincent, 50 La. Ann. 956, 24 So. 690 (1898) ; 85 C.J.S.
Taxation § 793 (1954).
"Meyer v. Chessman, 132 Mont. 187, 315 P.2d 512 (1957) : Sutter v. Scudder, 110
Mont. 390, 103 P.2d 303 (1940).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4180.
'Sutter v. Scudder, supra note 21; County of MusseIshell v. Morris Development
Co., 90 Mont. 201, 11 P.2d 774 (1932) ; Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Warranty
Title Co., 47 Mont. 513, 134 Pac. 302 (1913).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 844184.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4185.
[ Vol. 20,
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tax is illegal. Of course if the assessment is wholly invalid, no proceeding
thereon can ever be valid and the whole matter is a nullity."
There is a curative statute" which purports to validate all deeds execut-
ed before its enactment (1931) which are either merely irregular or utterly
void due to some failure to comply with the statutes relating to the time,
place, or manner of publishing the notice of sale. Such currative statutes
are, however, held in this state to be subject to the limitation that they
cannot cure any defect of a jurisdictional nature which necessarily causes
the deed to be utterly void.' This matter will be more fully discussed
below.
SALE
Time
The sale must be held not less than twenty-one nor more than twenty-
eight days from the time of the first publication of notice' and must be
commenced between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.' While Montana
has not ruled on this point, other jurisdictions have held compliance with
statutory time requirements to be a prerequisite to a valid sale.' Within
these general provisions, however, it is left to the discretion of the officers
charged with the duty to sell to determine the precise day and hour; but
the general rule is that it cannot be held on Sunday or some other non-
judicial day. And the sale must be held on the exact day specified in the
notice or the sale is void.' The day, of commencing a sale may be postponed
from "day to day," but it must be completed within three weeks of the
day first fixed." Though Montana has not interpreted this last provision
there are at least two possible constructions. One is that postponement
cannot be for more than a day at a time except that it may be set over
a legal holiday." The other, that it may be set from one day to another
(lay certain." If the sale is held at a time to which there has been no legal
adjournment (and presumably postponement as well) it has been held
to be invalid.' The statute requires the county treasurer to give notice
of the day to which it is postponed but makes no specific requirement as
to the method or form of such notice.'
"IMartiu v. Glacier County, 102 Mont. 213, 56 P.2d 742 (1936) 85 C.J.S. Taxation
§ 754 (1954).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4160.
'Martin v. Glacier County, &upra note 26.
"DR.C.M. 1947, § 84-4120.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4122.
85 C.J.S. Taxation § 801 (1954).
'Ibid.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4123.
'Collins v. Sherwood, 50 W. Va. 133, 40 S.E. 603 (1901).
'Burns v. Lyon, 4 Watts 363 (Pa. 1835). The Burns case, and the Collins case,
note 34, supra, pertained to statutes for adjournment of a sale when it was not
"completed" on the first day, while the Montana statute pertains only to postpon-
ing "the day of commencing the sale," but these decisions do represent the two
possible alternative constructions of our statute.
'City of Fall River v. Connecticut Mills, 294 Mass. 98, 1 N.E.2d 36 (1936).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4122. As to time of sale, see 85 C.J.S. Taa'ation § 801 (1954).
1958] NOTES
5
Swenson: Tax Titles in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1958
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Place
The sale must be held in front of the county treasurer's office."
Montana has not construed this section but it undoubtedly is a mandatory
provision. Some jurisdictions have used such strict construction that under
a statute requiring the sale to be held "before the court house door,"
a sale held inside the court house was void.' Other jurisdictions, however,
have held that a failure to hold the sale in the precise place is merely an
immaterial irregularity. ' There is, however, a Montana case discussed in
the following paragraph which, if literally followed, would require absolute
compliance.
Manner of Conducting Sale
A recent Montana case lays down a rule which holds the treasurer
to the strictest compliance with every provision of the statute at the risk
of voiding the sale.'
Proceedings on tax sales are in invitum. Every essential or mater-
ial step of the statute must be followed. If the requirements of the
statute are not strictly followed the sale may be avoided. In the
county treasurer's proceeding to sell the land there is no distinc-
tion recognized between the mandatory and directory require-
ments of the statute. The county treasurer must act as the statute
directs. Otherwise, he acts without authority and the purported
sale which he assumes to make is invalid. This holds true though
the requirement with which the county treasurer fails to comply
was not one enacted for the protection of the owner of the land.
To abolish the distinction between mandatory and directory provisions
in the statute seems to mean that no deviation, however slight, can be
considered as a mere irregularity, but that every deviation will result in
voiding the entire proceeding. How closely this will be adhered to is yet
to be seen, but it is certainly a warning to the county officers that com-
plete compliance with the statute will be the only way of insuring against
void sales.
There being only a few express statutory provisions governing the
maimer of tax sales, the general rules applicable to judicial and execution
sales seemingly govern." The statute indirectly provides the sale shall be
at a public auction ' and rules for such a sale should be analogous." The
statute provides the treasurer shall commence at the head of the list and
continue in an alphabetical or numerical order of lots and blocks until
completed.'
If a portion of tax-delinquent property will satisfy the county lien,
either the owner or the occupant has the right to request in writing
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4120.
'8ommers v. Ward, 41 W. Va. 76, 23 S.E. 520 (1895).
'Meyer v. Corn, 191 Okla. 537, 131 P.2d 62 (1942).
"Perry v. Maves, 125 Mont. 215, 217, 233 P.2d 820, 821 (1951).
"'These are found in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-5826 to -5845.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4117.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 66-201 to -219; 85 C.J.S. Tamation § 799 (1964).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4122.
[Vol. 20,
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what portion of his property he wants sold. But if no request is made
the land must be sold in its entirety." Apparently every separately as-
sessed piece of land must be sold separately and a sale of several lots
en vwsse for a lump sum is void if the tracts are not contiguous, except
when the county is the purchaser." If the purchaser fails to pay the tax
and costs before 10:00 p.m. of the day following the sale, his purchase
is annulled and the property must be resold on the next sale day, before the
regular sale. ' A purchaser who refuses to make payment is disqualified
from bidding on any other property advertised in the delinquency list
of that year.'
The county cannot compete in the bidding.' If it does the sale will
be void. Its right to buy at a tax sale is wholly governed by the statute
and exists only when there is no other buyer in good faith the first day
the property is offered for sale.5 ' In such case the whole amount of the
property assessed must be struck off to the county as the purchaser, and
this may be done the same day that the property was offered for sale.'
Separate non-contiguous tracts can be struck off en masse to the county.'
Where the county has become the buyer, the duplicate certificate
must be delivered to the county treasurer for filing. Thereafter he must
assign the interests of the county to any willing purchaser as provided in
section 84-4138, upon payment of taxes and costs.
CERTIFICATE
After the treasurer has received the amount of the taxes and costs to
be paid, the buyer is entitled to a certificate evidencing the assignment
of the state's lien to him. The county treasurer must make two copies of
the certificate, dated the day of the sale, enumerating therein six items:
(1) the name of the person assessed (if known), (2) description of the
land sold, (3) the amount paid therefore, (4) that it was sold for taxes,
(5) giving the amount and year of assessment, (6) the time when the
buyer will be entitled to a deed.' Before delivering the certificate the
treasurer must enter in a book the facts of sale as required by section
84-4129. The certificate must be signed by him and one copy delivered to
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4124.
'Skillen v. Harris, 90 Mont. 389, 3 P.2d 1054 (1931) ; Lindeman v. Pinson, 54 Mont.
466, 171 Pac. 271 (1918) ; Horsky v. McKennan, 53 Mont. 50, 162 Pac. 376 (1916) ;
Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Warranty Title Co., 47 Mont. 513, 134 Pac. 302
(1913) ; North Real Estate Loan & Title Co. v. Billings Loan & Trust Co., 36 Mont.
356, 93 Pac. 40 (1907) ; Casey v. Wright, 14 Mont. 315, 36 Pac. 191 (1894).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4125.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4126.
'Jensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 124 P.2d 1013 (1942).
RC.M. 1947, § 84-4124.
"'Jensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 124 P.2d 1013 (1942). Prior
to an amendment in 1929 the law was that after the first day if there was no
bona fide purchaser the property should be offered again and then, if no purchaser,
struck off. Therefore, a sale to the county could not be made on the first day.
But the amendment eliminated the requirement of a subsequent offering and
thereby eliminated the necessity of waiting till a subsequent day to strike it off.
Failure to repeal the reference to "the first day the property was offered for sale"
was an oversight since repeal of the other part leaves it without significance.
'Jensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, supra note 52.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4127.
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the buyer and the other filed in the office of the county clerk.' Upon
filing by the clerk, the lien of the state vests in the purchaser and can only
be divested by redemption.' The certificate creates or vests no title' and
does not entitle the buyer to possession of the land," but gives only an
inchoate right which, if pursued and protected, may ripen into title' and
entitles the holder to a deed passing title after the expiration of the period
of redemption.' When genuine and valid on its face it imparts to a subse-
quent buyer of the land constructive notice of the sale.'
Ordinarily, a buyer at a tax sale takes strictly under the doctrine
of caveat emptor." But by Montana statute a certificate owner or an
assignee of the state is given a right to recover from the taxing authority,
when the sale is adjudged void for irregularity, the amount of the money
paid w.ith interest at eight per cent per year from the date of payment."
In addition, he is given a lien on the land for any taxes, penalties, and
interest he has paid on the land. If he is in possession he cannot be ejected
until the full amount is paid to him." However, if the tax for which the
property was sold was void, the tax-sale buyer will not have a right to
recover the subsequent taxes paid by him.'
The compensation statute is worded in broad terms; by not enumerating
specific grounds it apparently authorizes reimbursement so long as the
sale was declared invalid for any "irregularity in assessment, levy, or sale."
What can be recovered for costs and improvements is not specified," but
recovery is provided for indirectly. Section 84-4158 provides that in any
action to set aside a tax deed, quiet title, etc., the court may order any
person claiming rights hostile to the tax title to deposit in court, to the
use of the purchaser, the amount of certain taxes and "all sums reasonably
paid thereafter by said purchaser or his successors after three years from
the date of said tax sale in preserving said property or in making im-
provements thereon while in possession thereof." If the adverse claimant
is successful in the action, the sum shall be paid to the purchaser or his
successors.'
Section 84-4124 contains a curative provision validating any certifi-
cate theretofore issued to any county and now held by the county, regardless
of irregularities in the manner of publishing the delinquent tax list, in
holding the sale, in selling the property, in issuance of the certificate of sale,
or in the form thereof, providing -the taxes for which it was sold were author-
ized by law to be assessed against the property and were lawfully assessed
and have not been paid. Retrospective curative statutes, however, apply only
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4128.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4130.67Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946).
"Anderson v. Mace, 99 Mont. 421, 45 P.2d 771 (1935).
"State ex rel. City of Billings v. Osten, 91 Mont. 76, 5 P.2d 562 (1931).
"°Tumlinson v. Tyler, 191 Okla. 518, 131 P.2d 98 (1942).
'Grant v. Cornell, 147 Cal. 565, 82 Pac. 193 (1905) ; 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 822 (1954).
"Larson v. Peppard, 38 Mont. 128, 99 Pac. 136 (1909) ; Birney v. Warren, 28 Mont.
64, 72 Pac. 293 (1903).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4131.
"Ibid.
"Barke v. Early, 72 Iowa 273, 33 N.W. 677 (1887) ; 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1012 (1954).
wSee 85 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 1013-14 (1954).
"Schull v. Lewis and Clark County, 93 Mont. 408, 19 P.2d 901 (1933).
[Vol. 20,
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to matters or acts which the legislature could have made immaterial by
previous statute, i.e., matters which in their nature are merely irregulari-
ties and do not extend to matters of jurisdiction." If this statute is taken
at face value, and if there is substantial compliance with the statutes as
to notice of sale, a certificate of sale is valid despite other irregularities.'
However, it appears that the statute is applicable only to certificates
issued before the 1923 law and then only if the county were the purchaser
and still holds the certificate."
REDEMPTION
The property sold can be redeemed by the owner or by any person
having any interest in or lien upon the property' within thirty-six months
from the date of purchase, or at any time prior to the giving of the notice
and application for a deed" as required in sections 84-4151 and 84-4156.
The date on which the period is to commence is subject to at least two
interpretations. In Brasch v. Mumey, where the statute read, "within
one year after the sale," the court held the language was not indefinite or
ambiguous but referred to the day on which the sale was made by the
commissioner. But under a statute reading exactly like Montana's, i.e.,
"from the date of purchase," it was held this meant the day the money was
paid in full to the county by the buyer or in the case that the county is
the purchaser, when it pays the full amount due the state." Montana
apparently has not construed this phrase but it is possible that the re-
demption period might be found to begin on the date the certificate is
filed with the county clerk, that being the time that the lien of the state
passes to the buyer and arguably the day the purchase is "complete."' 5
The general statutory rule for computing the time will probably be applied;
i.e., exclude the first day and include the last unless the last is a holiday
and then it is also excluded." Thus a deed issued on the last day for re-
demption would be invalid. The redemption period continues and does
not expire until notice and application for tax lien are duly made as pro-
vided in section 84-4151."
The amount necessary to redeen is the amount paid at the tax sale
by the buyer, one per cent additional for each month which elapses from the
"Martin v. Glacier County, 102 Mont. 213, 56 P.2d 742 (1936).
'Morse v. Kroger, 87 Mont. 54, 285 Pac. 185 (1930) (dictum).
"'The 1923 amendment (Laws of Montana, 193, c. 46, § 1) added the curative portion
of R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4124. Subsequent amendments to and re-enactments of the
statute have neither changed this portion of the statute nor indicated a legislative
intent to enlarge its scope. This fact, coupled with R.C.M. 1947, § 43-510, results
in R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4124 curing only certificates of sale issued to any county prior
to the effective date of the 1923 amendment, which were at that time still held by
the county. See Snidow v. Montana Home for the Aged, 88 Mont. 337, 292 Pac.
722 (1930).
"Jensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 124 P.2d 1013 (1942).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4132.
"99 Ark. 324, 138 S.W. 458 (1911). Accord, In re Seick, 46 Cal. 363, 189 Pac. 314
(1920).
"Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).
"See Tennessee Marble and Brick Co. v. Young, 179 Tenn. 116, 163 S.W.2d 71 (1942).
"6R.C.M. 1947, § 90-407.
"Hartman v. Nimmack, 116 Mont. 39, 154 P.2d 279 (1944).
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date of sale until redemption,M and any taxes which the buyer might have
paid on the land subsequent to the tax sale with interest at eight per cent
per annum from the date of such payment." Taxes assessed for years
prior to the sale need not be paid in order to redeem. ' If the county is the
buyer or holder of the certificate, section 84-4186 requires that the property
be assessed the following year. If these taxes are not paid when due, the
land will be again sold and this will continue so long as the taxes are not
paid or the property redeemed from such sales. However, no such sale may
be made unless the Board of County Commissioners so directs.' No deed
can be issued to any buyer other than the county under such sales until
the applicant pays all the taxes, penalties and interest accumulated at
the time of the application. Purchasers of certificates of tax sales for the
years subsequent to the oldest outstanding certificate have the same privi-
lege of redemption of the oldest outstanding tax sale certificate as the
original owner of the property. If the county is the buyer and the property
is subsequently assessed according to section 84-4146, the redemption
amount includes the subsequent assessment, costs, fees and interest.' The
amount can be paid to the certificate owner or his assignee or the county
treasurer for the use of the former, in which case the treasurer must credit
the amount paid to the person named in the treasurer's certificate and
pay this on demand to the person or his assignee. ' Section 84-4135 provides
that upon receiving the certificate of sale the county clerk must file and
enter it. When the clerk is presented with a receipt from the person named
in the certificate or from the county treasurer for the use of the former,
for the total amount of the redemption money, he must mark redemption
on the certificate and in the book where the entry of the certificate is
made." The redemption statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of
any person entitled to redeem.' The right of redemption is considered to
be a vested property right ' and every opportunity will be given a delinquent
owner to redeem. Likewise, every presumption will be raised to prevent a
forfeiture. ' Thus a person under a disability is generally held able to re-
deem regardless of his inability to contract ' and a corporation which has
not qualified to do business in Montana may redeem as mortgagee, re-
demption not being considered as "doing business." ' But the right is
wholly statutory so that a person must bring himself within the statute
provisions."
However, the redemptioner need not redeem the entire property.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4130.
I-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4131.
"Tilden v. Chouteau County, 85 Mont. 398, 279 Pac. 231 (1929).8 R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4187.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-188.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4133.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4136.
8Stensvad v. Ottman, 123 Mont. 158, 208 P.2d 507 (1949) ; State em rel. Bell v. Mc-
Cullough, 85 Mont. 435, 279 Pac. 246 (1929).
'Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949).
'Ibid.; Mitchell v. Garfield County, 123 Mont. 115, 208 P.2d 497 (1949) ; Ross v. First
Trust & Savings Bank, 123 Mont. 81, 208 P.2d 490 (1949).
'See annotations in 65 A.L.R. 582 and see Stensvad v. Ottman, 123 Mont. 158, 208
P.2d 507 (1949).
'Stensvad v. Ottman, 123 Mont. 158, 208 P.2d 507 (1949).
"State ex rel. Bell v. McCullough, 85 Mont. 435, 279 Pac. 246, 66 A.L.R. 1033 (1929).
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Piecemeal redemption of any portion of the land is expressly provided
for," upon payment of a proportionate amount of taxes for which it was
sold, plus payment of subsequent taxes thereon and the appropriate portion
of any other tax which is a lien thereon." Other states allow apportionment
and piecemeal redemption only where the property is owned in severalty
and not in conjunction with any other party."
In addition to the right of redemption, the delinquent taxpayer is
given a preferred right of purchasing from the county after issuance of
the deed."
The treasurer is required by law to assign all the interests of the
county in any land bid in by the county to any person who will make
payment of the required amount;" and the assignee is to be in the same
position for acquiring a deed thereto as any buyer of land at a tax sale."
ACQUIRING THE DEED
Any time after the expiration of the thirty-six month redemption
period the certificate owner is entitled to a tax deed. There are two
methods of applying for and obtaining such a deed in this state and the
holder of the certificate has the option as to which method he will employ."
The more formal method is by an action in the district court to obtain
the deed; in such an action the state is a necessary party defendant." It
is commenced and prosecuted as the ordinary civil action, with judgment
ordering the issuance of the tax deed to the plaintiff. The alternative
is an informal statutory method" in which the buyer applies to the county
treasurer for the deed after giving notice to the owner and others speci-
fied in section 84-4151. This proceeding is wholly ex parte, except for
the notice required to give opportunity for redemption; the courts have
no part therein. It is in effect an action in rem, to which all parties inter-
ested in the property are parties defendant.' The title conveyed and the
rights of the grantee by either method are exactly the same.' Discussion
here is limited to the statutory method, as it is the more common and gives
rise to more litigation than any other step in the entire tax deed pro-
ceeding.
Notice
Montana, according to a federal case, has adopted the general rule
that the law enforced at the time of the tax sale and issuance of the
certificate governs the notice of application to be given.' The statutory
"'R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4155; Mitchell v. Garfield County, 123 Mont. 115, 208 P.2d 497(1949).
"State ex rel. Federal Land Bank v. Hays, 86 Mont. 58, 282 Pac. 32 (1929).
"State ex rel. Onderton v. Sommers, 242 Wis. 484, 8 N.W.2d 863, 145 A.L.R. 1324(1943) ; 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 878 (1954).
-'R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4190.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4138.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4139; 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 838 (1954).
"Sanborn v. Lewis and Clark County, 113 Mont. 1, 120 P.2d 567 (1942).
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 84-4162 to -4169; State ex rel. Freebourn v. Yellowstone County,
108 Mont. 21, 88 P.2d 6 (1939).
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 84-4151 to -4153, -4156, -4157.
'State ex rel. Freebourn v. Yellowstone County, supra note 98.
'Richardson v. Lloyd, 90 Mont. 127, 300 Pac. 254 (1931).
'"Fariss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co,, 31 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mont. 1940).
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requirements of this method apply with equal force whether the buyer
be the county or a private party.' Under the statutory method the first
and most important step is the giving of written notice by the certificate
holder indicating his intention to apply for a deed in compliance with
section 84-4151.' The purpose of the notice is to warn the landowner and
others interested of the impending issuance of the tax deed and termination
of the right of redemption.'
The giving of notice is jurisdictional and unless compliance with
the law is accomplished and verified by an affidavit filed with the
county treasurer, the tax deed should not issue. The law imparts the
dignity of process to the notice. To deprive the title holder of his property
without this notice is to deprive him of his property without due process
of law.' Consequently, the issuance of a deed void for want of notice of
application for deed does not start the running of the statute of limita-
tions.' The notice must be given by the certificate owner at least sixty
days before either expiration of the redemption period or the date of his
application for a deed. If either the redemption or notice time limit is
violated the notice will be void and no valid deed can issue.'
If notice is not properly served on one party entitled thereto, the
ensuing deed is not only void as to him but absolutely void as to the whole
world and any interested party may take advantage thereof, even though
he himself had proper notice.'
Notice must be given to three classes of persons: (1) the owner, (2)
any occupant, and (3) any holder of an unreleased mortgage of record
or his assignee. There are three references in the statute as to the manner
in which notice is to be given. The first sentence states that the purchaser
must "serve" the notice; this at face value would seem to mean personal
service. But it is immediately qualified by the second provision that
'notice of any owner, mortgagee, or assignee of any mortgagee shall be
given by registered letter addressed to such mortgagee or assignee at the
post office address of said owner, mortgagee, or assignee as disclosed by
the mortgage records in the office of the county clerk and recorder." The
third statutory provision is that if the land is unoccupied or is a mining
claim, the notice must be by registered mail, deposited in the post office,
addressed to any known record owner residing in or outside the county. 0
In all cases where the address of either the owner, mortgagee, or assignee
is unknown, notice must be published once a week for two consecutive
weeks in a newspaper published in the county where the property is
situated; the first publication being at least sixty days before the date
of the end of the three-year redemption period or of application for the
deed. There is no provision made for the possibility that there is no news-
"NSmall v. Hull, 96 Mont. 525, 32 P.2d 4 (1934) ; Hinz v. Musselshell County, 82
Mont. 502, 267 Pac. 1113 (1928).
"'Sanborn v. Lewis and Clark County, 113 Mont. 1, 120 P.2d 567 (1942).
1°5Ibid.
'Small v. Hull, 96 Mont. 525, 32 P.2d 4 (1934).
'Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949).
"'Fariss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 31 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mont. 1940).
'(Jensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 124 P.2d 1013, 140 A.L.R.
658 (1942) ; but see Milne v. Leiphart, 119 Mont. 263, 174 P.2d 805 (1946).
"'Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 103 P,2d 303 (1940).
[Vol. 20,
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paper published in such county. The requirement of publication depends
not on whether the name is known, but upon whether the post office
address is known. If the registered letter is returned to the sender, the
notice must be published in the statutory form.
Notice is to be given to the occupant by personal service in all cases.
Occupancy, and consequently the right of the occupant to notice, is deter-
mined not by the right to occupancy but by whether the use which he makes
of the property constitutes actual occupancy so that an observer of the
scene would be reasonably apprised of the fact that it was occupied."
The written notice is to state (1) that the property or a portion there-
of has been sold for delinquent taxes, (2) the date of the sale and the
amount of property sold and the amount for which it was sold, (3) the
amount due, and (4) the time when the right of redemption will expire or
when the purchaser will apply for a deed. Deviation in substance will be
strictly scrutinized, and cause the notice to be absolutely void."'
".. .' [S] uch notice' does not mean'some notice' or'any notice' and neither
the county treasurer nor the judiciary may substitute their own ideas as to
what should be considered the equivalent of or substitute for the notice
required by the legislature."" The fact that a party had actual knowledge
is immaterial; it is the notice required by the statute which is controlling.'
In ordinary cases our statute does not require that the property owner
be named in either the written or published notice.
The proceedings to enforce the tax lien are in rem and 'if the
owners are named in the proceeding and personal notice is pro-
vided for, it is rather for tenderness to their interests, and in
order to make sure the opportunity for a hearing is not lost to
them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that
form.' §1405, Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed.'
But where an undivided interest in a mining claim is involved, the name
of the owner must appear; otherwise the description of the property will be
so uncertain and ambiguous as to be incapable of identification."'
An inaccurate or uncertain description defeats every step subsequently
taken and uncertainty cannot be cured by evidence aliunde' But by
our statute the description is not defective merely because it includes
property of more than one owner.'
The notice must state exactly the amount due so the owner will be
apprised of the amount he will have to pay to redeem. Otherwise notice
is invalid."'
'Shumaker v. Tracy, 126 Mont. 477, 253 P.2d 1053 (1953); Van Voast v. Blaine
County, 118 Mont. 395, 167 P.2d 572, 169 A.L.R. 681 (1946) ; Van Voast v. Blaine
County, 118 Mont. 374, 167 P.2d 563 (1946).
"1Hinz v. Musselshell County, 82 Mont. 502, 267 Pac. 1113 (1928).
"'Perry v. Maves, 125 Mont. 215, 218, 233 P.2d 820, 821 (1951) ; Jensen Livestock Co.
v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 296, 124 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1942).
"'Kerr v. Small, 112 Mont. 490, 117 P.2d 271 (1941).
'Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 396, 103 P.2d 303, 306 (1940).
"Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 175 P.2d 182 (1946).
u'Ibid.
"aSutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 103 P.2d 303 (1940).
'Hinz v. Musselshell County, 82 Mont. 502, 267 Pac. 1113 (1928).
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In all cases proof of service of notice, in whatever manner given,
supported by the affidavit required by section 84-4156, must be filed
immediately with the county clerk and recorder. Thereafter such proof
of notice is prima facie evidence of the sufficiency of the notice. No valid
deed can issue until this proof is filed.
An example of sufficient proof where the county is the buyer has
been an affidavit filed by the county clerk in the treasurer's office show-
ing he deposited in the United States Post Office at a certain time a
registered envelope containing a copy of the notice, postage prepaid, ad-
dressed to the owner (stating the name and address).' Though the case
makes no mention of the registered return slip, it would seem to be a
necessary part of the proof. But an unsworn statement of the county clerk
is no proof at all, and the proof must show when the notice was mailed.'
Affidavit of Service of Notice
Along with the proof of service of notice the applicant is required to
file an affidavit detailing the facts of such service.' The filing of an
affidavit which meets the statutory requirements is jurisdictional. With-
out such an affidavit the treasurer is wholly lacking in power and author-
ity to issue the deed.' This particular element of the tax deed procedure
constitutes one of the most dangerous traps in the entire tax deed pro-
ceeding; many an otherwise perfectly good tax deed has been held invalid
because of a technical defect in the affidavit. The affidavit, in particular,
is the basis on which the treasurer is to act and the conditions upon which
his power to issue the deed arises must appear therein.' References in
the affidavit to records in other public offices will not suffice because the
treasurer is limited in his determination of what has transpired to an
inspection-of the documents before him.' It is not enough that proper
and valid notice was in fact given, or that he had knowledge of it but did
not correctly state it in the 'affidavit. In Montana it is a firm rule that
in determining the sufficiency of tax title proceedings, the records alone
can be considered and defects or omissions may not be corrected or sup-
plied in any manner dehors the record.' On the other hand, however, even
though the record affirmatively shows that all necessary steps were taken,
evidence outside the record is admissible to show that a requirement was
not complied with in fact and thereby establish the voidability or voidness
of a deed.tm
The affidavit must be explicit. The county treasurer has no authority
to indulge in any presumptions with regard thereto. Nothing can be read
into it that does not plainly appear therein. The provisions of the statute
are mandatory and absolute. Any failure to comply with the statutory re-
'
1Milne v. Liephart, 119 Mont. 263, 174 P.2d 805, 140 A.L.R. 666 (1946).
tmSanborn v. Lewis and Clark County, 113 Mont. 1, 120 P.2d 567 (1942).IUR.C.M. 1947, §§ 84-4151, -4156.
'nLowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949).
'Harrington v. McLean, 70 Mont. 51, 223 Pac. 912 (1924).
"Bentley v. Rosebud County, 230 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1956).
'"Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949).
'Kerr v. Small, 112 Mont. 490, 117 P.2d 271 (1941).
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quirements relating to the affidavit will void the deed subsequently
issued.'
Although the wording of this provision has been somewhat moderated
since 1935,' the interpretation will probably continue to be the same.'
The affidavit must state the essential facts as distinguished from
mere conclusions showing that the notice required has been given, or state-
ments that such notice has been given in the manner required by law.'
Therefore it is mandatory that the affidavit show affirmatively whether
or not the property is occupied or unoccupied." If the affidavit is silent
as to occupancy the treasurer cannot properly determine from it whether
he is authorized to issue the deed.' If the property is occupied, the affi-
davit must show that the person on whom notice was served was at the
time occupying it.' Otherwise the deed issued thereunder is void.1
The affidavit is defective if it is worded with uncertainty and al-
ternatives, (e.g., "owner or owners, and mortgagees if any") and fails to
state clearly and specifically the acts that were done and the persons to
whom notice was given and how and when served.'
The affidavit must show the date of service, to inform the treasurer
whether the notice was given at least sixty days before he issues the deed.'
There are two curative statutes relating to the notice requirements.
Section 84-4153 validates any deed issued to any county, city or town be-
fore the 1927 enactment of the provision, despite defects in the notice,
provided that such notice was actually given or posted and caused to be
published and proof thereof made by someone acting in behalf of the
county, city or town. Section 84-4160 (1) validates any deed issued be-
fore the 1933 enactment of the provision, despite any defects in the form,
2'Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949).
'-R.C.M. 1935, § 2212, now R.C.M. 1947, § 844156.lThe 1935 section required the affidavit to show "that the notice hereinbefore re-
quired to be given, has been given as herein required." This phrase, and particu-
larly the italicized words, gave rise to an extremely critical policy in passing upon
the validity of the affidavit. The 1947 amendment does not incorporate this part
of the old statute. See Perry v. Maves, 125 Mont. 215, 233 P.2d 820 (1951).
's'Perry v. Maves, 125 Mont. 215, 233 P.2d 820 (1951).
'"Davis v. Steingruber, 131 Mont. 468, 311 P.2d 784 (1957); Mitchell v. Garfield
County, 123 Mont. 115, 208 P.2d 497 (1949) ; Ross v. First Trust & Savings Bank,
123 Mont. 81, 208 P.2d 490 (1949) ; Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208
P.2d 478 (1949).
uoJensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 124 P.2d 1013, 140 A.L.R.
658 (1942).
'Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Warranty & Title Co., 47 Mont. 513, 134 Pac. 302(1913).
7Harrington v. McLean, 70 Mont. 51, 223 Pac. 912 (1924). In Lowery v. Garfield
County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949) the property was sold for delinquent
taxes for 1926, the deed issued to the county In 1939, the county conveyed to the
defendant In 1941, the plaintiff, owner, brought an action in 1946, twenty years
after the tax assessment and seven years after the deed was issued. At the time
of service of the notice and for fifteen years prior thereto, the land was unoccupied.
The plaintiff, owner, was the only person entitled to notice and the statutory re-
quirements as to notice were fully complied with. But the affidavit was silent as
to the fact of occupancy. Held, the affidavit was Invalid and consequently the
subsequent deed was Invalid and the plaintiff can redeem the property. Angst-
man's dissent, urges that the fact of occupancy was not required by the statute
and that the majority substitutes shadow for form.
'Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 175 P.2d 182 (1946).
'wBentley v. Rosebud County, 230 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1956).
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substance, or amounts stated to be due in the notice, and, as of 1939, for
any failure to give the full sixty days notice required by section 84-4151,
provided at least thiry days notice was given.
Though there are relatively few cases elaborating on the specific de-
fects cured by these and similar statutes, several observations have been
made as to the effect of curative statutes in general. "The general rule
in the application of validating statutes is that a curative statute may
cure any requirement or step which the legislature might have made im-
material by a prior law,'."' but the legislature is "powerless to enact
valid legislation exempting tax deeds from attack for failure to comply
with requirements of a jurisdictional nature. . . . Enforcement of such
legislation would result in the unconstitutional taking of one's property
without due process of law." Likewise, "a curative statute cannot breathe
life and validity into void tax deed proceedings or void tax deeds." 0
Hence the real questions are, what requirements are of a "jurisdic-
tional" nature, and what defects cause a deed to be void rather than
voidable. This is as yet not a settled matter, although there are a few
cases relating to the subject. It is certain that no curative statute can
correct a complete failure to give any notice at all.1' The description of
property is also jurisdictional and the deed is void and incurable if the
description is uncertain and ambiguous.' But an error in stating the
correct amount due is not jurisdictional.'
What other defects in notice will be cured is uncertain. One case
would severely limit -the operation of section 84-4160, declaring that the
act, Laws of Montana, 1937, c.132, "relates only to mistakes in stating in
the notice the amount due and required to be paid in order to redeem.""
The court held that there were other "defects and omissions in the service
of the notice as to show a complete failure to follow the requirements of
the law in that respect, which render the tax deed application proceedings
clearly insufficient without regard to the statement in the notice of the
amount required to redeem." There was no mention in the case of the
possibility of the "substance" of the notice being cured. It seems this
language may overrule Stoican v. Washburn.' The Stoican decision recog-
nized the other part of the curative statute. It held that if there were any
other defects in the notice (other than the amount necessary to redeem)
they were of such nature as to be within the validating statute.
Section 84-4159, a statute setting a two-year statute of limitations on
actions to set aside tax deeds, was held to be unconstitutional as a special
law in Lowery v. Garfield County.'"
'Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 410, 175 P.2d 182, 191 (1946). Accord, Martin
v. Glacier County, 102 Mont. 213, 219, 56 P.2d 742, 744 (1936).
'-"Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 583, 208 P.2d 478, 484 (1949). Accord,
Kerr v. Small, 112 Mont. 490, 117 P.2d 271 (1941) ; Small y. Hull, 96 Mont. 525,
32 P.2d 4 (1934).
'Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 409, 175 P.2d 182, 191 (1946).
'uSmall v. Hull, 96 Mont. 525, .42 P.2d 4 (1934).
'42Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 175 P.2d 182 (1946).
"sHoward v. Newlon, 112 Mont. 189, 114 P.2d 272 (1941) ; Martin v. Glacier County,
102 Mont. 213, 56 P.2d 742 (1936).
'"Sanborn v. Lewis and Clark County, 113 Mont. 1, 19, 120 P.2d 567, 575 (1942).
"112 Mont. 603, 120 P.2d 426 (1941).
"122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949).
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Deed
The issuance of the deed is the final step in the proceeding. The
treasurer is compelled by statute' to issue a tax deed when the property
is not redeemed within the thirty-six month period, if all the essential re-
quirements of the statutes have been met so that he has the necessary
authority. Ile either does or does not have such authority, and thus the
deed cannot be good as to some parties and void as to others. It will either
be good or bad as to the whole world.' Where a county, city or town is
the purchaser and certificate holder when the time of redemption expires
(presumably the thirty-sixth month), there is at least three years there-
after in which it is left to the discretion of the board of county commis-
sioners or city or town council or commission as to when it will require the
proper official to apply for the deed "9 and no one can complain that ap-
plication was not promptly made.' However, on the expiration of the
three year discretionary period, it apparently becomes the mandatory
duty of the official body to order the proper official to apply for the tax
deed. In all cases, such application must be made in accordance with
section 84-4151.
If the deed is drafted in the form set out in section 84-4157, it will
when duly acknowledged and approved be prima facie evidence that:
1. The property was assessed as required by law.
2. The property was equalized as required by law.
3. The taxes were levied in accordance with law.
4. The taxes were not paid.
5. Notice of tax sale was given and published, and property sold
at the proper time and place as provided by law.
6. The property was not redeemed, and the proper notice of applica-
tion for deed was served or posted as required by law.
7. The person who executed the deed was the proper officer.
8. Where the real estate was sold to pay taxes on personal property,
that the real estate belonged to the person liable to pay the tax.
It must be kept in mind that the deed will be construed most strongly
against him who claims under it and if one of two constructions will
support the claim of the citizen, the deed must be held invalid.' But if
all the proceedings are regular and the grantee is entitled to legal title,
the treasurer must correct a defective deed and execute another deed
which is proper.' Deeds have been held void for an uncertain and am-
bigious description of the property.' The substance of a certificate and
deed will vary when the county, and not a cash purchaser, is taking it. Lan-
guage in an early case went somewhat beyond the issue to state that where
the county is the buyer at the sale
-"R,C.M. 1947, § 84-4137.
"OJensen Livestock Co. v. Custer County, 113 Mont. 285, 124 P.2d 1013 (1942).UR.C.M. 1947, § 84-4152.
'EFHartman v. Nimmack, 116 Mont. 392, 154 P.2d 279 (1944).
m'Rush v. Lewis and Clark County, 36 Mont. 566, 93 Pac. 943 (1908).
m Gallash v. Willis, 90 Mont. 148, 300 Pac. 569 (1931).
'"Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 175 P.2d 182 (1946).
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The recitals in the deed must show the right of the county to take
the property, and that it did not enter the list as a competitive
bidder for the same. Unless the recitals of the deed show these
things, or if the deed recites, as does the deed in question, matters
showing the county was a competitive bidder at the sale, the deed
on its face is void.l'
Likewise
where a county becomes the purchaser of property at a tax sale
. . . the certificate of sale, as well as the deed, should show
that there was no purchaser in good faith for the property on the
first day that the property was offered for sale . .. and that
the whole amount of the property assessed was struck off to the
county as a purchaser, and should otherwise truthfully state
the facts.'
SHORT FORM FOR QUIETING TITLE
There is no longer any provision in our statutes making the deed
conclusive evidence of the facts recited therein as appeared in the 1935
Code. There is, however, a very liberal short method of quieting title
found in part 2 of section 84-4761 which purports to allow a quick and
complete method of perfecting title. The provision validates any deed
issued more than three years and thirty days after sale "irrespective of
any irregularities, defects, or omissions, or total failure to observe any
of the provisions of the statutes recording the assessment, levying of taxes,
and sale. . . [other than that the taxes were not delinquent or have been
paid]." To benefit by this provision the deed holder need only publish
a notice one a week for two weeks stating the facts set out by the statute
and stating the name of the person in whose name the property was as-
sessed or taxed and asserting a demand that such person pay within thirty
days the amount of taxes, interest, and penalties or bring a suit to quiet
title or set aside the deed. If within the thirty days the demand is not
complied with, the deed is to be valid despite defects. However, research
has not disclosed any ease to date which has applied or construed this
provision.
The date that the title passes has been held to be the date of application
for the deed.' Section 84-4161, which clearly states that the time was the
date of expiration of three years following the date of sale, was amended
by Laws of Montana 1937, c.63 (now section 84-4170) which provides with
less clarity that title is conveyed, "as of the date of expiration of the
period for redemption." The "date" was construed in Hartman v. Nim-
mack' to be the date of application and not the end of the three-year
term, the reason for the holding being that a party can redeem any time
until the application is made.
"Rnsh v. Lewis and Clark County, 36 Mont. 566, 569, 93 Pac. 943, 944 (1908).
'3lRush v. Lewis and Clark County, 37 Mont. 240, 243, 95 Pac. 836, 837 (1908).
'-Hartman v. Nimmack, 116 Mont. 392, 154 P.2d 279 (1944).
""Ibid.
(Vol. 20,
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PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PURCHASE
When the county becomes the owner of land by tax deed the statute
requires that the board of county commissioners, within six months after
acquiring title, order a sale of the land at public auction at the front door
of the court house, after giving the required notice set out in the statute?"
No sale can be made for a price less than the fair market value as fixed
by the board before making the order. The original owner or his successor
in interest is given a preferential right to purchase, subject to the con-
ditions of the statute, if he acts before the time fixed for the first offering
of the property for sale, by payment of -the full amount of the taxes,
penalties, and interest due at the time the deed was taken. The statutory
permission to buy necessarily imposes upon the board a mandatory obliga-
tion to sell.' But the right is purely statutory and its terms must be
strictly complied with. Consequently, if the original owner fails to exer-
cise the right before the time fixed for the first offering, it is forever
lost.'
CONCLUSION
From the earliest days tax titles have given rise to one of the largest
single items of litigation in this state. Time and space do not permit an
examination of the state of the law elsewhere or how the situation has been
dealt with by others, but the problem is by no means peculiar to this juris-
diction. In 1888 Henry Campbell Black wrote in his treatise on tax titles :'
The amount of litigation in regard to tax titles has of late
years largely increased; and at the present this has become one
of the most considerable -- as it has always been one of the most
intricate -- branches of real property .... There was a period in
the history of our jurisprudence when it had become proverbial
that a tax title was no title at all; . . . and when the strictness
of the laws and the severity of the courts combined to make the
risking of one's money upon a tax title an experiment so haz-
ardous that it would have been regarded as foolhardy, save for
the smallness of the stakes....
But this aspect of affairs has changed. The various states
applied themselves to the task of rescuing their tax titles from
the reproach into which they had fallen, of imparting greater
security to the holders of such titles, and at the same time, of
giving increased facility and certainty to the working of their
revenue systems. To this end retrospective and prospective cura-
tive statutes were adopted, the rule of exact compliance with the
statutory formulas was considerably relaxed, short statutes of
limitations were enacted, and tax deeds were made presumptive
evidence of title....
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-4190.
l'wBlackford v. Judith Basin County, 109 Mont. 578, 98 P.2d 872, 126 A.L.R. 639
(1940).
'aBeckman Bros. Inc. v. Weir, 120 Mont. 305, 184 P.2d 347 (1947).
4'BLAcK, THE LAW OF TAx TITLEs iii-iv (1888); see also 1 BLACKW LL, Powma m
SELL LAND 3-4 (5th ed. 1889).
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But the state of affairs did not change in Montana, as the decisions
cited have illustrated. It is interesting to note that the legislature did
try each of the reforms enumerated by Mr. Black, but each in its turn
was either struck down by the court or deprived of its intended scope
and effect. It is clearly a rare exception that a tax title is upheld once
it reaches the courtroom, and until the attitude of the judiciary changes,
further statutory revision would seem vain. It has long been established
that where land is subject to taxation, the land can be sold to collect the
taxes,' and it follows that it is essential to the taxing power of the govern-
ment and the interests of purchasers and their privies that there be sub-
stance, not mere form. to the proceeding. A just balance must be reached
between the need to protect the rights of land owners and the equal social
need to protect rights acquired through the tax sale. The Montana Su-
preme Court has recently, evidenced a new awareness of the problem in
finding adverse possession under the theory that a void tax deed is color
of title.' But adverse possession is not an adequate solution; the remedy
still lies in a more liberal construction of the entire tax proceeding.
LAWRENCE S. SWENSON
THE NEW MULTIPLE USE MINING LAW
Within the next few years many Montana attorneys, if their advice
has not already been sought, will be called upon to counsel their clients
about the ramification of the 1955 Multiple Use Mining Law.'
This law is not designed to divest the miner of his sub-surface rights,
nor of the surface rights necessary to his mining operations, but it is de-
signed to encourage simultaneous development of the other surface re-
sources of the same tract of land.
The law applies to public land administered by the Department of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management in the Department
of the Interior; it does not apply to land in any national park or monu-
ment, or to any Indian lands.' The new law has no application whatso-
ever to any patented mining claim.' It is intended to affect but two classes
of mining claims: (1) unpatented mining claims located after its enact-
ment [July 23, 1955], and (2) unpatented mining claims located prior
to its enactment which are based on invalid discoveries. However, as will
'wBLAcK, THE LAW OF TAx TITLES 60-61 (1888).
'Schumacher v. Cole, 131 Mont. 166, 309 P.2d 311 (1957) ; Long v. Pawlowski, 131
Mont. 91, 307 P.2d 1079 (1957) ; Hentzy v. Mandan, 129 Mont. 324, 286 P.2d 325
(1955). These cases in general uphold the proposition that seasonal adverse pos-
session, as for instance, sheep grazing in the summer, is sufficient if that use is
one for which the land is suited. A county may adversely possess. Griswold v.
Lagge, 132 Mont. 23, 313 P.2d 1013 (1957). Actual possession of a part of a tract
with color of title to the whole extends the possession to the limits fixed by the
color of title. Fitschen Bros. Co. v. Mayes Estate, 76 Mont. 175, 246 Pac. 773(1924). See also Shepherd v. Cox, 191 Miss. 715, 4 S.2d 217 (1941).
169 Stat. 367-372 (1955), 30 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603, 611-15 (Supp. IV, 1957). Herein-
after, all citations to the foregoing sections of 30 U.S.C. are to Supplement IV, 1957.
230 U.S.C. § 601.
'30 U.S.C. § 612 (b).
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